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RECONCILING SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
Bradley Scott Shannon*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few, if any, concepts in civil procedure are more important than
subject-matter jurisdiction.' Subject-matter jurisdiction has long been
regarded as an essential component of every civil action, a prerequisite
to a valid and enforceable judgment.2 Indeed, so important is this
concept, at least in federal courts, that the defense of lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction (which generally results in a dismissal) may be raised
at almost any time, even on appeal, and even by the court itself.3
* Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank Professor Philip Pucillo,
Michigan State University College of Law, for inviting me to present this Article as part of the
Workshop on Civil Procedure at the 2017 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual
Conference in Boca Raton, Florida; Professor David Marcus, University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law, for inviting me to present the Article at the Third Annual Civil Procedure
Workshop in Tucson, Arizona; and Anthony M. Deardurff, Deputy Director, Faculty Division of
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, for inviting me to do the same at the their
2018 Annual Faculty Conference in San Diego, California.
1. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.1, at 9 (5th ed. 2015)
("When deciding where to file suit one of the first questions that must be answered is whether the
chosen court has the power or competence to decide the matter to be adjudicated. This requirement
most often is stated in terms of whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute
and should be distinguished from questions of personal jurisdiction, which focus on the court's
authority to enter a judgment that is binding on the particular defendants involved." (footnote
omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 562 (2017) ("A court must
have the power to decide the claim before it (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the power over the
parties before it (personal jurisdiction) before it can resolve a case."); see also 2 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 cmt. a, at 30 (AM. LAW. INST. 1982) ("A fundamental element of
procedural fairness is that a tribunal presuming to adjudicate a controversy have legal authority to
do so. One aspect of the question of authority is whether the tribunal is empowered to adjudicate the
type of controversy that is presented. This is conventionally referred to herein, as the question of
subject matter jurisdiction."). Incidentally, though subject-matter jurisdiction presumably is
something of a universal legal concept, the focus of this Article is the operation of subject-matter
jurisdiction in American courts, primarily (though not exclusively) federal district courts as it relates
to civil (as opposed to criminal) proceedings.
3. See, e.g., Louisville &NashvilleR. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908) (holding
that the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court sua sponte on
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It is therefore somewhat surprising that the law relating to subjectmatter jurisdiction remains unsettled. Yet, over the past two terms alone,
the Supreme Court of the United States has dealt with this issue more
than once. 4 Subject-matter jurisdiction also continues to be a topic of
scholarly debate.'
Why the controversy? Undoubtedly, part of the reason relates
(again) to subject-matter jurisdiction's stature. Particularly when the
stakes are high, whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction can have
enormous consequences, thus providing incentives for creative
arguments in this regard. But stature alone does not seem to explain the
extent of the disagreement.
Perhaps another reason why subject-matter jurisdiction remains
controversial relates to the incoherence of the term "jurisdiction," which
even the Supreme Court has described as "a word of many, too many,
meanings."' Courts and commentators have had difficulty determining
whether any particular concept is "jurisdictional," and if jurisdictional,
the consequences of that determination.
In a recent Article, Jurisdiction and Its Effects,' Professor Scott
Dodson posits that "jurisdiction" simply "determines forum in a
multiforum legal system"-that is, "[i]t is a structural concept that helps
allocate cases, define boundaries, and maintain relationships among
competing forums."8 Thus, Dodson concludes (unsurprisingly) that
concepts such as subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
are, in fact, "jurisdictional."' But also jurisdictional are several other
concepts not ordinarily so regarded, such as venue.'o Dodson further
posits that "jurisdiction's effects are separate from its label; a
jurisdictional limit-just like a nonjurisdictional limit--could have

appeal, resulting in the dismissal of the action).
4. In addition to Lightfoot, see V. L. v. E. L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020-21 (2016).
5. See Jessica Berch, Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Casefor Permitting Waiver
of Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Defects, 45 MCGEORGE L. REv. 635, 638 n.3 (2014)

("Federal subject-matter jurisdiction has also received renewed scholarly attention in recent
years.").
6. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v.
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of
Jurisdictionby Consent, 40 N.C. L. REv. 49, 49 n.1 (1961) ("It is not clear why some procedural
requirements are 'jurisdictional."').
7. Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionand Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017) [hereinafter Dodson,
Jurisdiction and Its Effects]. This latest Article builds on Dodson's earlier work in this area. See,
e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionalityand Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42
(2007); Scott Dodson, MandatoryRules, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2008).
8. Dodson, JurisdictionandIts Effects, supra note 7, at 621.
9. Id. at 635.
10. See id. at 622, 636.
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some, all, or none of the effects commonly tied to jurisdiction."" Thus:
"Because jurisdiction has neither unique nor immutable effects,
Congress (or a court, if appropriate) can supply whatever attendant
effects best implement the underlying goals of a particular jurisdictional
limit."l2 Moreover: "Nothing inherent in jurisdiction's identity
necessarily precludes consideration of party preference, judicial
discretion, or the equities. These features ought to be considered part of
the lawmaking authority's arsenal for maintaining workability and
fairness in the legal landscape."13
Professor Dodson's work represents a significant breakthrough in
our understanding of this concept. But even assuming Dodson is
correct-and certainly he advances a powerful argument in that
direction-more work remains. Understanding whether some particular
concept is "jurisdictional" is helpful, but still unanswered are the
ramifications of that determination. The current challenge seemingly is
to determine, as a normative matter, precisely what "effects" each form
of jurisdiction must or should possess, and whether and to what extent
those effects should vary among those different forms and even between
different types of courts.
Given the length of Dodson's "nonexhaustive" list of jurisdictional
doctrines,14 a full exploration of these issues could prove to be a
daunting task." The goals of this Article accordingly are more modest.
This Article will focus primarily on subject-matter jurisdiction (and
specifically, the original subject-matter jurisdiction of the United States
District Courts), "freed from effects-based definitions."l 6 By so limiting
the inquiry, perhaps we can not only assess the propriety of current
subject-matter jurisdiction practice, but also begin to imagine how this
exercise might apply to other forms of jurisdiction.
So: What should be the effect(s) of subject-matter jurisdiction (or a
lack thereof)? To what extent (if at all) should these effects differ from
those associated with other forms of "jurisdiction," such as personal
jurisdiction and venue? To what extent (if at all) should these effects
differ between federal and state courts? And to what extent (if at all)
should there be differences in the ability to raise jurisdictional defects on

11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id. at 637.
14. See id. at 635 (listing more than ten such doctrines).
15. See id at 657 (observing that "nothing about jurisdiction-including the current
approach-is simple").
16. Id. at 636.
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direct and collateral review? It is these various effects that this Article
will explore.
Following this Introduction, this Article moves (in Part II) to an
investigation and critique of many of the "effects" commonly associated
with federal subject-matter jurisdiction, including the requirement that
the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction be pleaded in the complaint (and
accordingly receive a response in the answer); the almost unlimited time
currently given to defendants to raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
as a defense; and the somewhat disparate treatment given to cases on
direct review in relation to those on collateral review. This Article will
then suggest (in Part III) some ways in which federal subject-matter
jurisdiction practice perhaps might be "reconciled" with state subjectmatter jurisdiction practice and with the practice relating to other
Dodsonian forms of "jurisdiction," such as venue.
This Article will conclude that many of the differences in the
effects of federal subject-matter jurisdiction vis-A-vis other forms of
jurisdiction cannot be justified, or at least that the benefits of
maintaining these divergent practices do not outweigh the costs. This
Article will further conclude that in most instances, federal subjectmatter jurisdiction practice should move closer to state subject-matter
jurisdiction practice and to the practice associated with other procedural
defenses, such as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue.
The hope, therefore, is that, through this exercise, we might be able
to achieve some "reconciliation" between federal subject-matter
jurisdiction practice and these various other areas. And if so, then
perhaps we can expect not only some simplification of this area of
procedural law, but also fewer disputes in the application of this
doctrine." Judges, lawyers, and law students alike should be most
interested in this possibility.
II.

THE SINGULAR EFFECTS OF FEDERAL
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

This Article considers a number of "effects" (or qualities or
characteristics) of federal subject-matter jurisdiction as currently
understood and tries to determine whether these various effects, to the
extent they diverge from those relating to other forms of "jurisdiction"

17.

See, e.g., CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 265 (2d ed. 2015)

('Students naturally want to know if the principle [that full faith and credit is not due a judgment
rendered without personal jurisdiction] applies in the same way when what was lacking in [the first
case] was subject matter, rather than personal, jurisdiction. The answer to this question is murkier
than it should be.").
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(such as personal jurisdiction and venue), as well as state practice, are
justifiable. But before getting into the details, a little more context might
help set the stage. Normative considerations aside, the "effects" of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction are well-established. Perhaps the
classic recapitulation is that found in what is perhaps the leading
authority in this area, which, after laying the constitutional and statutory
foundation, states:
From the twin principles discussed above-that Article III of the
Constitution delineates the possible range of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction and that congressional enactments define the actual scope
of that jurisdiction at any given time-it follows that federal
jurisdiction is limited in nature. The practical effect of this proposition
is that there is a presumption against federal jurisdiction: whereas the
ability to hear a case is presumed in state courts of general jurisdiction,
in the federal system the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction
generally must be demonstrated at the outset by the party seeking to
invoke it. It cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, nor can its
absence be waived. If a subject-matter jurisdiction defect exists, it may
be raised at any time, even on appeal, and the court is under a duty to
point it out if the parties do not.18
Several observations can be made with respect to this summary.
The first is its canonical nature. It is literally hornbook law, and similar
statements are both ubiquitous and almost completely uncontroversial.
The thinking here is well-entrenched.
A second observation is that this summary, though seemingly
uncontroversial, does place federal subject-matter jurisdiction in a
relatively unusual, almost unique position. Though a few concepts, such
as personal jurisdiction and venue, produce similar effects, nothing else
operates quite like subject-matter jurisdiction in terms of the
presumption surrounding its propriety, the obligation to plead it, its
invulnerability to waiver, etcetera. Of course, this fact alone does not
mean that this summary is in any way incorrect. But it does cause one to
consider what it might be about the nature of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction that justifies these distinctions.
A final observation is related to the second. The first sentence of
this summary is (again) uncontroversial; of course federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is limited in nature, for it does not even purport to cover all
actions." But the remainder of this paragraph is a non-sequitur. Why, for
example, should the fact that such jurisdiction is not unlimited result in a
18.

FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1,

19.

Id.
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presumption against such jurisdiction, or require a plaintiff to plead it?
Why is federal subject-matter jurisdiction not subject to consent or
waiver, when other important, even constitutional, provisions are? Why
is there almost no limit as to when a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction
may be raised? And what is the source of the "duty" to raise such defects
sua sponte? It is these and other questions that will be explored in more
detail in the remainder of this Part.
A.

The PleadingRequirement

As students of federal civil procedure know well, subjectmatter jurisdiction must be pleaded in the plaintiffs complaint (as well
as any other pleading asserting a claim). Specifically, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8-which has changed little since its inception20
provides: "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
jurisdictional support ....
According to one leading treatise, "[t]he reason for the rule
is evident." 2 2
As Article III of the Constitution makes clear, the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is no presumption that they
have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular case. Indeed,
until the court's jurisdiction is demonstrated, the converse is true.
Hence, the complaint in a federal court action must demonstrate that a
basis for federal jurisdiction exists .... 23
At least at first blush, there does seem to be some logic behind this
requirement. Under the Constitution, the "judicial power of the United
20. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CIviL § 1201, at 85 (3d ed. 2004) ("Rule 8 has been amended only twice since its
promulgation and those alterations were of a relatively minor nature.").
21. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(1). Incidentally, for simplicity and clarity, this Article will use
"plaintiff" as a proxy for any claiming party (which, overwhelmingly, are in fact plaintiffs), and
"complaint" for any pleading that states (or purports to state) a claim for relief. Similarly, this
Article will use "defendant" for any responding party, and "answer" to represent any responsive
pleading. Finally, this Article will use "Rules" to refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
22. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1206, at 110.
23.

Id. (footnote omitted); accord 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3522, at 100, 103-04 (3d ed. 2008) ("It is a principle of first importance
that the federal courts are tribunals of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Most state courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, and the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction over
any controversy unless a showing is made to the contrary. The federal courts, on the other hand,
cannot be courts of general jurisdiction .... Accordingly, there is a presumption that a federal court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must
affirmatively allege the facts supporting it." (footnote omitted)).
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States" is "vested" in "inferior courts" (such as the district courts) only
as ordained and established by Congress. 24 The Constitution also limits
the judicial power of such courts to certain "cases" or "controversies,"25
and has been interpreted as conferring upon Congress not only the power
to specify the jurisdictional reach of those courts, but to do so in a
manner that falls short of constitutional limits. 2 6 For these reasons, it is
probably fair to conclude (as many have) that "[t]he subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited because the limited nature of
federal power is a constitutional priority." 27 And from this, one may
fairly surmise that care should be made to ensure that federal
district courts do not overstep their jurisdictional bounds, and certainly
one way to help achieve that might be to implement a jurisdictional
pleading requirement.
But though there are undoubtedly good and valid reasons why any
court-federal or otherwise-must have subject-matter jurisdiction of
the action, it also seems that one still may fairly ask whether a pleading
requirement is truly necessary, or if not, whether such a requirement, on
balance, is even a good idea. And upon closer inspection, it seems that a
jurisdictional pleading requirement is not at all necessary, and though it
probably has some salutary benefits-it might cause some plaintiffs to
consider the issue more carefully, and it might provide some limited
guidance for defendants and courts 2 -it is questionable whether the
benefits of such a requirement exceed the costs associated therewith.
Let us start with the supposed distinction between courts of
"limited" jurisdiction and those of "general" jurisdiction. Though federal
district courts are, indeed, courts of limited jurisdiction, such jurisdiction
is not all that limited. Federal district courts in fact have jurisdiction of a
wide array of actions, including (most significantly) those "arising
under" federal law 2 9 and those where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 and involve parties regarded as being "diverse."30 This is not a
trivial number of actions; for example, during the twelve-month period

24.

U.S. CONST. art. in,

§ 1.

25. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
26. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993) ("Congress has the
constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts .....
27.

SPILLENGER, supranote 17, at 266.

28. See, e.g., 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1206, at 117 ("In spite of [some]
manifestations of a liberal judicial attitude toward Rule 8(a)(1), the pleader always is safer if he or
she complies with the rule and alleges the basis for the court's jurisdiction separately and plainly.").
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
30. Id. § 1332. "In addition, federal jurisdiction is exercised in suits in which the United
States is a party, in admiralty and maritime cases, in actions between two or more states, and in a
few other limited situations." FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.2, at 14.
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ending December 31, 2016, the number of civil actions filed in federal
district courts exceeded 292,000.31 On the other hand, though state
courts of "general" jurisdiction undoubtedly enjoy a greater
jurisdictional reach than their federal counterparts, such jurisdiction
certainly is far from unlimited. For example, a number of federal statutes
vest exclusive federal jurisdiction of certain federal actions.32 The
bottom line is that there is no court in the United States-including
(contrary to popular belief) the Supreme Court of the United Statesthat has subject-matter jurisdiction of all actions. All American courts
are limited in significant respects.3 3
It is, therefore, not entirely clear why one should presume that a
state court of general jurisdiction in fact has subject-matter jurisdiction
of any given action, or that a federal district court does not. 34 It is
probably true that, simply as a matter of probability, a state court is more
likely to have jurisdiction of any given action than a federal court. But it
is difficult to see why anything of significance-including a special
pleading requirement that applies in one court and not the other-should
follow from this fact. Court selection is almost never random, and the
propriety of subject-matter jurisdiction must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis.35 The reason for a special pleading rule for actions in federal
court, in other words, is far from evident.
Of course, these observations do not necessarily show that the
federal court jurisdictional pleading requirement should be eliminated.
To the contrary, perhaps they suggest that state courts also should
adopt a similar requirement. But for the reasons that follow, it seems,
on balance, that the better approach would be to eliminate all
such requirements.

31.

See

Table C,

US.

District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced,

Terminated, and

Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, 2015 and 2016, U.S. CTs.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/stfj c 1231.2016.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2018). It might also be observed that, but for budgetary and other, more "political," reasons, this
number could be much higher. For example, it is well-established that the amount-in-controversy
requirement, as well as the "complete diversity" rule, being statutory (rather than constitutional)
limits, could be eliminated by Congress. Even federal question jurisdiction could be expanded if
taken to its constitutional limit.

32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 ("Admiralty, maritime and prize cases"); id § 1334
("Bankruptcy cases and proceedings"); id § 1338 ("Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights,
mask works, trademarks and unfair competition").
33. This fact largely explains why subject-matter jurisdiction is a topic in virtually every
course on civil procedure.
34. Cf FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.1, at 14 ("By and large, federal court subjectmatter jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the courts of the various states. This means that most
cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction also can be heard in the state courts.").
35. Id§2.1,at9.
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For one thing, simply pleading a basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction obviously does not make it so. The plaintiff might be
mistaken, and though pleading a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction
might point the defendant and the court in a certain direction, such
indications fall short of proof. For example, simply alleging diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does not show how the
parties are diverse, that they are in fact diverse, or that the amount in
controversy in fact exceeds $75,000.36

Of course, the opposite is true as well, for subject-matter
jurisdiction might well be proper even if not pleaded. Thus: "While a
statement of jurisdiction is required by Rule 8, failure to include one
does not necessarily require that the action be dismissed."3 7 "Indeed, it
has been held that the absence of a complete allegation of jurisdiction
does not even require amendment of the complaint when the district
judge readily can recognize the existence of a federal question or
diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy." 3 8
Accordingly, when "determining whether a federal district court actually
has subject matter jurisdiction, compliance with Rule 8(a)(1) is
ascertained by looking at the entire complaint, not merely to what
purports to be the jurisdictional statement."39
Thus, allegations of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction,
which standing alone might be sufficient, will not protect the pleader
against a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) if an examination of the
entire complaint reveals that the assertion of jurisdiction is not
substantial or that the jurisdictional statements were not made in good
faith. Conversely, the district court may sustain jurisdiction when an
examination of the entire complaint reveals a proper basis for
assuming subject matter jurisdiction other than one that has been
improperly asserted by the pleader or otherwise demonstrates that
jurisdiction exists when the Rule 8(a)(1) allegation is defective in
some regard. 40
Second, whether pleaded or not, the basis for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction usually will be apparent from the other allegations in the
complaint. For example, a claim based on a federal statute almost
certainly raises a federal question for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.41

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
2 JAMEs WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.03[1], at 8-10 (3d ed. 2017).
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 20, § 12.14, at 163-64.
Id. § 12.06, at 113-14.
Id. at 114-16 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 113.
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Thus: "[i]n most cases . . subject-matter jurisdiction will not involve a
difficult inquiry."4 2
Third-and perhaps most importantly-plaintiffs have tremendous
incentives to plead subject-matter jurisdiction even in the absence of any
requirement to do so. Plaintiffs desperately want to avoid a dismissal, or
even an argument along this line. Pleading subject-matter jurisdiction
would probably be prudent in those situations where the basis is unclear,
or perhaps even debatable. And certainly pleading subject-matter
jurisdiction would not be prohibited even if this requirement were to be
eliminated.4 3 This dynamic, coupled with past practice," provides good
reason to think that the pleading of subject-matter jurisdiction would not
suddenly disappear if not mandated. The question here, though, is
whether plaintiffs should be requiredto plead subject-matter jurisdiction
in every action. The proper comparison, then, is not between a
requirement to plead jurisdiction and no ability to plead jurisdiction
whatsoever, but rather between a mandatory pleading requirement and a
more voluntary regime.
Fourth, with or without a jurisdictional allegation, there are also
tremendous incentives for the plaintiff to "get it right." Defendants tend
to scrutinize the complaint and make their own determination as to
subject-matter jurisdiction, and if lacking, to seek a dismissal at the
earliest opportunity. A motion to dismiss results in delay and added cost
to the plaintiff, both of which generally inure to the benefit of the
defendant. If the motion is granted, the action will be terminated, at
which point the plaintiff will be forced to decide whether to abandon the
action or recommence in a state or foreign court-events that not only
result in additional cost (including, potentially, embarrassment) but also
increase the likelihood of a statute of limitations problem. There is, in
other words, good reason to think that subject-matter jurisdiction will
almost always be proper whether pleaded or not. Though many of the
cases relating to subject-matter jurisdiction might be well-known, the
litigation of this issue is actually quite rare in practice.45
42. 2 MOORE, supra note 37, § 12.30[l], at 12-40.
43. Id. § 8.03[1], at 8-10.
44. Though plaintiffs without legal training and without the benefit of counsel might be
oblivious to these issues, one can take some solace in the fact that the sample "Complaint in a Civil
Case" form (Pro Se 1) on the United States Court website includes a detailed "Basis for
Jurisdiction" section. See Complaint for a Civil Case, U.S.

CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/

forms/pro-se-forms/complaint-civil-case (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (follow "Download Form"
hyperlink).
45.

Cf DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 142, 144 (2011) ("In today's world,

terrorists are the most significant practitioners of the art of inducing availability
cascades.. . . [Defined as] a self-sustaining chain of events, which may start from media reports of a
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Fifth, the district court itself has some incentive, as well as
something of a duty, to make the same inquiry. Though a court might
not be obligated to assess the propriety of subject-matter jurisdiction in
every action,46 it "may, and often does, consider the question of
jurisdiction of its own accord even though the defendant has not moved
for dismissal on this ground. Thus, the absence of a challenge to the
jurisdictional allegations does not immunize the pleading from attack." 47
And though we generally presume that courts are indifferent as to which
party should prevail, there is probably some incentive to clear one's
calendar. Less work generally is better than more. 48 Though one can
imagine that some judges, for various reasons, might want to retain
certain cases, the balance seemingly will usually tip in the other
direction. Bottom line, between the defendant and the court, it seems
quite unlikely that an action lacking subject-matter jurisdiction would
survive the pleading stage, with or without a jurisdictional allegation.4 9
And sixth, there is the fact that defective jurisdictional allegations
are easily curable, in that the pleading in question almost certainly may
be amended both by rule"o and per statute." This actually creates some
disincentives for plaintiffs to properly plead jurisdiction in the first
instance (even if jurisdiction exists in fact). Of course, if a defective
jurisdictional allegation is not curable, the fact that a plaintiff has failed

relatively minor event and lead up to public panic and large-scale government action.").
46. Certainly, one can find statements in the literature saying that district courts are so
obligated. See, e.g., 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3522, at 126 ("Even if the parties remain
silent, a federal court, whether trial or appellate, is obliged to notice on its own motion its lack of
subject matter jurisdiction .... ). But it is probably more accurate to say that if a district court
"becomes aware of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss. It does not seem to require
a court to conduct an independent inquiry regarding subject-matter jurisdiction in every case."
Bradley Scott Shannon, Some ConcernsAbout Sua Sponte, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 27, 31

(2012); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) ("[I]f the record
discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the
parties make no contention concerning it." (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440
(1936))).
47. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1214, at 164.
48. There is probably also some incentive for the district court to avoid getting reversed on
this basis on appeal, though here this presumes that this issue may be raised by the defendant even
in the absence of a ruling on this issue. As will be discussed, currently this is possible, though this
Article will argue that this practice should cease. See infra Part III.C.
49.

See SPILLENGER, supra note 17, at 265 (positing that a judgment rendered without federal

jurisdiction "is an infrequent thing, since both litigants and the federal courts themselves are
generally fastidious about raising and determining the question of the court's subject matter

jurisdiction").
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (describing the extremely liberal federal pleading amendment
scheme).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2012) ("Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended,
upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.").
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to plead a proper basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is the least of that
party's problems.
One might also consider that while the basis for subject-matter
jurisdiction must be pleaded in federal court, the same is not true of
other "jurisdictional" prerequisites, such as personal jurisdiction and
venue.5 2 Admittedly, there might be some occasions when the basis for
personal jurisdiction might not be known until the service of the
complaint, an act that cannot be accomplished prior to commencement.53
But venue almost always may be pleaded, and though not required, it
often is,54 for pleading venue provides some of the same benefits to
defendants and courts as pleading subject-matter jurisdiction currently
does. The larger point, though, is that defendants seem to have little
trouble raising such other procedural defects even in the absence of any
pleading requirement."
And then there is state practice. As intimated earlier, in many (if not
most) states, there is no requirement that subject-matter jurisdiction be
pleaded in trial courts of "general" jurisdiction.56 Yet the lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction constitutes a defense that results in the dismissal of
the action," and notwithstanding the lack of a pleading requirement,
defendants and courts seem to have little trouble raising this defense
when appropriate.
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court."); FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c) ("A summons must be served [on the defendant] with a copy of the
complaint.").
54. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 6817641 (W.D. Wa. Feb. 1,
2017) (No. C17-0141JLR).
55. Some might attempt to distinguish such other procedural defects on the ground that a
defendant conceivably could consent to personal jurisdiction otherwise lacking, or improper venue,
etc. But even assuming that some courts might respect such decisions (which, it must be conceded,
are rare), it is less clear that they would be obligated to do so. The idea that subject-matter
jurisdiction is not subject to consent might also be contestable, a topic that will be taken up later.
See infra Part III.E. 1. In any event, such possibilities (again) do not detract from the larger point,
which is that other jurisdictional defects rarely go undetected, pleading requirement or not.
56. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 425.10(a) (2005) ("A complaint or cross-complaint
shall contain both of the following: (1) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in
ordinary and concise language. (2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims
to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be
stated."); WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 8(a) (2015) ("Claims for Relief") ("A pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, shall
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and
(2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems the pleader is entitled.").
57. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 430.10 ("The party against whom a complaint or crosscomplaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the
pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading."); WASH. Sup. CT. Civ. R. 12(b)(1) (providing
for the defense of "lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter").
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The bottom line is that a federal court jurisdictional pleading
requirement, though familiar, is not at all necessary. What this
requirement actually does is compel both plaintiffs and the defendants to
engage in behavior that is largely inconsequential and is typically
ignored by courts. Though it might provide something in the way of
benefits, such benefits are almost certainly outweighed by the costs.
What really matters is whether there is a valid basis for federal subjectmatter jurisdiction, not whether it is pleaded.
There is also a cost resulting from the disunity between federal and
state practice. Of course, state courts need not follow federal practice,
and some have actually touted the benefits of disunity." But just as
variations in local rules (i.e., intrasystem disunity) add costs, so does
intersystem disunity. So although a jurisdictional pleading requirement
might be nice, so would a uniform pleading requirement. That, of
course, might never occur. Still, it seems that any differences should
require special justification, and tradition alone is not always sufficient.
In most instances, the better practice, traditional or not, probably should
prevail. And here, the better practice seems to point toward the
elimination of the subject-matter jurisdiction pleading requirement.
B.

Responding to the Complaint

The Rule 8(a) pleading requirements discussed above-including
the pleading of the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction-of course
apply only to plaintiffs." But once a plaintiff has pleaded (or has
attempted to plead) a claim for relief, the attention turns to the
defendant. Rule 8(b)(1) requires a defendant to respond to the complaint,
and in his answer "(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses," and
"(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it."60 Notwithstanding
the order in which these requirements are set forth in this rule, it has
become customary to present them in reverse order-i.e., defendants
58. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts
Should Not Replicate Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 501, 502 (2016) ("States could follow their federal counterparts; indeed, the pursuit of
uniformity can be instinctive. Yet this Article urges states to resist the siren song of uniformity in
favor of more noble pursuits."). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, FederalRules, Local Rules, and
State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PENN. L. REV.
1999 (1989) (describing the reform of civil procedure pursuant to federal and state jurisdictions).
59. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). This pleading of defenses seems to be particularly important,
given the number of times this requirement is mentioned in the Rules. In addition to Rule 8(b)(1)),
see FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) ("In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense .... ); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) ("Every defense to a claim for relief
in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required.").
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typically admit or deny the plaintiffs allegations first, and then state
any defenses.
Starting with subparagraph (B): because Rule 8(a) requires a
plaintiff to plead subject-matter jurisdiction, the defendant (again) must
admit or deny this allegation. 6 2 Of course, if the subject-matter
jurisdiction pleading requirement were to be eliminated (as this Article
will suggest in Part III, below), there might be no need to respond to
allegations of this nature, a double benefit. Still, as discussed above, a
plaintiff conceivably could include a jurisdictional allegation even
absent any requirement to do so, which would then resurrect this
obligation. 6 Fortunately, this is typically a straightforward exercise.
But there remain are some aspects of this requirement that seem
rather curious.
The first relates to the scope of the defendant's obligation. Assume,
for example, that the plaintiff alleges that the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship).'
Assume further that although the parties in fact are not diverse, the court
nonetheless has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(federal question) a la Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
65
Should the plaintiffs allegation be
Engineering & Manufacturing.
admitted or denied? The answer to that question might depend upon
whether the relevant portion of the allegation is the assertion of
jurisdiction or the basis asserted. But if the former, then does this mean
that a defendant is obliged to find a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction
that the plaintiff has not pleaded?66 The answer seems unclear.
Also curious is the effect of an admission. Ordinarily, allegations
admitted by the opposing party are conclusively established for purposes
of the action." The same is generally true if the defendant fails to

61. See, e.g., The Defendant's Answer to the Complaint (Pro Se 3), U.S. CTS.,
(last visited Apr. 15,
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms/defendants-answer-complaint

2018) (follow "Download Form" hyperlink).
62. It seems possible that a defendant might lack knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief about the truth even of a jurisdictional allegation. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b)(5). Though in
practice that is rare. In any event, by rule such a statement has the effect of a denial. See id
63. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.

64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
65. 545 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2005) (holding that district court has federal-question subjectmatter jurisdiction of a state-law claim that necessarily raises a stated federal issue, is actually
disputed and substantial,

and that a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any

congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities).
66. Notice that this problem does not go away if the defendant were to admit that the court
has jurisdiction but deny the basis pleaded.
67. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 36(b) ("A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.").
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respond to an allegation.68 But neither of these statements seem to be
quite true with respect to allegations of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
orthodox view (at least in federal court) seems to be that a defendant
may not consent to subject-matter jurisdiction, nor may such a defense
be waived or forfeited.6 9 Accordingly, a failure to deny subject-matter
jurisdiction in the defendant's answer seems to have little effect on the
court's ability to dismiss on this basis7 0 or on the defendant's ability to
raise this defense in the future." Indeed, in Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger,72 the defendant initially admitted jurisdiction (and
nothing else), and did not contest jurisdiction until the third day of
trial." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held on appeal that such
jurisdiction was lacking.74 Thus, just as the pleading of subject-matter
jurisdiction largely seems to be a pointless exercise, so does the
requirement that the defendant respond to such an allegation.
Similar problems surround subparagraph (A). Rule 8(b)(1)(A)
requires that all defenses be pleaded in the answer,75 and that certainly
includes the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.7 6 But Rule
12(b) also permits the assertion of seven specified defenses (again
including subject-matter jurisdiction) by motion, with the caveat that a
"motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if
a responsive pleading is allowed." 77 The obvious purposes of these
provisions are, first, to compel the defendant to bring potential defenses
(particularly the seven defenses specified in Rule 12(b)) to the plaintiffs
and the court's attention early in the proceedings (and certainly no later
than the service and filing of the answer), and second, to give the
defendant the opportunity to obtain a ruling as to these defenses prior to

68. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(b)(6) ("An allegation-other than one relating to the amount of
damages-is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.").
69. See infra Part II.E..
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)-(c) (empowering
district courts to grant motions for relief from final judgments that are "void" so long as made
within a "reasonable time").
71. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 cmt. a, at 32 (AM. LAW. INST.
1982) ("Broadly speaking, an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be taken at any time
during the action, even on appeal, and may be taken after the action has become final under a wider
variety of circumstances than the objection to territorial jurisdiction.").
72. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
73. See id. at 368-69.
74. See id at 369.
75. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A).
76. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (reiterating this requirement, and referring specifically to the
defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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the filing of an answer.18 Because a defendant has tremendous incentives
to move for a dismissal on this basis as soon as practicable, it would
seemingly be the rare defendant who would not take advantage of this
alternate procedure. In most situations, to not do so would be a mistake,
for if the motion is granted, the action is dismissed, meaning there would
then be no need to serve and file an answer, something a defendant
would rather not do.
With respect to subject-matter jurisdiction, this essentially means
that the only time a defendant would have occasion to plead this defense
is if the court were to deny the motion to dismiss. But in that situation, it
seems that the defendant's record as to this defense has already been
made, thus rendering its inclusion in the answer superfluous and
unnecessary. It therefore appears that the set of answers in need of a
defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is probably an empty one.
A second problem with Rule 8(b)(1)(A) relates to the effect of
pleading such a defense. Simply pleading a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction does not, of itself, compel a ruling on this defense
(incidentally, the same also seems to be true of the denial of an
allegation of subject-matter jurisdiction)." Only a motion (whether by
the defendant or the court itself) accomplishes this.so Though the
pleading of this defense might provide something in the way of notice, it
accomplishes little else. The allegation just sits there." Accordingly,
much like the requirement that a defendant respond to allegations of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the requirement that this defense be pleaded
in the answer seems almost pointless. This is decidedly not true of
certain other procedural defenses (such as the defenses of lack of
personal jurisdiction and improper venue) that are expressly waived if a
defendant either fails to "make it by motion under [Rule 12]" or "include
it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1)
as a matter of course." 8 2 But this statement does appear to be true of lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, which "[u]nder prevailing procedural
rules .

.

. is not lost by failure to plead it.""

78. 2 MOORE, supra note 37, § 12.02, at 12-11 to 12-12.
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
81. Rule 12(i) does provide: "If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)-(7)whether made in a pleading or by motion-and a motion under Rule 12(c) must be heard and
decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(i). But though
this rule does provide some mechanism for resolving such issues prior to the conclusion of trial, a
motion still is required.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(B).
83.

2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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Motions to Dismiss andfor Relieffrom Judgment

Yet another set of problems with subject-matter jurisdiction relate
to motions to dismiss and for relief of judgment on this basis.
As discussed above, Rule 12(b) provides that a motion asserting
any of the seven defenses described therein "must be made before
pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed." 84 Again, this language
seems to be true with respect to motions to dismiss for defects such as
lack of personal jurisdiction" or improper venue,86 in that such defenses
are waived if the defendant fails to either "make it by motion under this
rule" or "include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed
by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course."" But this portion of Rule 12(b)
does not seem to apply to motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Despite the fact that this defense is included in Rule 12(b),"8
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction seemingly
need not be made prior to the service and filing of the answer, or even
during trial.89 Instead, Rule 12(h)(3) rather bluntly states that "[i]f the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action."o Indeed, Rule 60 gives the court the
power to relieve a party from a final judgment if it determines that
subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, the only limitation being that the
motion be made within a "reasonable" time.91
It is generally said that the issue can be raised at any time by anyoneeven on appeal by the court itself, or even by a party who participated
actively in the action without challenging the jurisdiction or invoked
the jurisdiction in the first place. Subject-matter jurisdiction, unlike
territorial jurisdiction, cannot be conferred by the defendant's consent,
collusion, waiver, or estoppel. 92
Indeed, as mentioned previously, federal subject-matter jurisdiction
is considered so important that federal courts have something of an

84. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
86. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
87. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(1)(B).
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1).
89. Cf FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(1), (2).
90. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
92. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 268 (2001) (footnote omitted) (citing Thompson v. Whitman,

85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 459 (1874)).
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obligation to raise any defects in this regard sua sponte, on their own
motion, if the matter is not raised by a party. 93 In sum, "[w]hile other
defects may be waived, subject-matter jurisdiction stands alone as the
single unwaivable defect."94 But why all of this is not reflected in Rule
12(b) remains unclear. 95
Perhaps more importantly, why the disparate treatment of subjectmatter jurisdiction? Tradition aside, the reasons here also are not entirely
clear. For example, Professors Casad and Clermont, in line with the lore
in this area, state: "The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is
regarded as being of fundamental importance." 96 Certainly, subjectmatter jurisdiction is important (at least as much as anything in
procedure is important). But of "fundamental" importance? What
exactly does that mean? And even if true, why does this justify some
special treatment? Similar explanations have been advanced, but none
seem particularly persuasive. 97

93. See, e.g., 2 MOORE, supra note 37, § 12.30[1], at 12-35 (footnote omitted) ("Lack of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Indeed, even if the litigants do not identify a
potential problem in that respect, it is the duty of the court-at any level of the proceedings-to
address the issue sua sponte whenever it is perceived.").
94. Berch, supra note 5, at 639.
95. Incidentally, the federal practice in this area stands in some contrast to state practice. See,
e.g., SPILLENGER, supra note 17, at 266 ("A defendant who makes a general appearance in Case A
and who fails to challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction (for example, to argue that the case
instead should have been heard by the small claims court) can be said to have waived his objection.
(This is not true for the subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts, but is generally true in the state
courts.)"). A recent example of the confusion of these standards can be found in V. L. v. E L., 136
S. Ct. 1017 (2016). VL. involved an adoption decree entered (erroneously?) by a Georgia Superior
Court that was later attacked in an Alabama court. Id. at 1019. Though the Supreme Court of the
United States ultimately held that the Georgia decree was entitled to full faith and credit, it first
considered whether the Georgia court had jurisdiction of the adoption proceeding. Id. at 1020-2 1.
Arguably, the Supreme Court instead should have simply found that the defendant had waived any
objection to subject-matter jurisdiction by not raising it in the Georgia court. The Supreme Court's
further finding that the Georgia court was a court of general jurisdiction, though perhaps not
necessary, also should have been sufficient. I thank Professor Joseph Glannon for bringing these
points to my attention.
96.

CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 92, at 268.

97. Representative is this passage from a leading treatise:
[A]llocations of subject matter among the courts in a state, important as they are, do not
usually rise to the same level of constitutional gravity as do the limitations of federal
jurisdiction. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited because the
limited nature of federal power is a constitutional priority; the subject matter jurisdiction
of the various courts of a state (putting aside the degree to which Congress may have
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts to hear claims arising under certain
parts of federal law) is usually just a decision by a state concerning how it wishes to
allocate its judicial resources.
SPILLENGER, supra note 17, at 266.
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Perhaps the best explanation is that advanced in the Restatement

(Second) of Judgments:
In this respect the question of subject matter jurisdiction is very
different from the question of territorial jurisdiction or one of
regularity of notice. This difference has been explained by the fact that
an objection to subject matter jurisdiction is in some sense more
fundamental than objections to territorial jurisdiction or notice, in that
a court is powerless to decide a controversy with respect to which it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. But such an analysis would require
that a court's decision as to its own subject matter jurisdiction could
not be accorded conclusive effect, contrary to the established rule in
that regard. It would also require that a judgment be forever vulnerable
to attack in subsequent proceedings, on the ground that the court by
which it was rendered had lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would
take for granted that the presently prevailing rule on timing of an
objection to subject matter jurisdiction is required in the nature of
things, and would thus make it impossible to foreclose objections to
subject matter jurisdiction after judgment in the trial court.
A more satisfactory analysis of the treatment of the objections to
subject matter jurisdiction is simply historical. The proposition that the
subject matter jurisdiction of a court could be questioned in an attack
after judgment originally found expression in the English common law
courts in cases dealing with judgments of courts of limited jurisdiction.
It was reinvigorated in early decisions of our federal courts in cases
involving their own jurisdiction, which was then new and regarded
with some hostility. In these contexts, the interest of securing rigorous
adherence to jurisdictional limitations was a strongly predominant
policy consideration. It was one that therefore could appropriately be
given precedence over the interest of fairness that would otherwise
dictate that a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction ought to be
unavailable unless raised before trial on the merits. In modem context,
the relative weight of these interests has shifted. It may well be that
procedural rules of the future will be reformulated to require that
objections to subject matter jurisdiction be raised before trial on the
merits, thus expressing a policy approaching that now applied to
objections to territorial jurisdiction.98
Perhaps, as a normative matter, that time has come. In any event, as
things now stand, the language in Rule 12(b) regarding the timing of

98. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d, at 110-11 (AM. LAW INST. 1982)
(citations omitted); see also id § 12 cmt. b, at 118 (referring to the "peculiar procedural treatment of
subject matter jurisdiction," and observing that the "special treatment of the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction is ... an obstacle to a rational theory as to when the right to litigate the issue should
finally terminate").
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motions to dismiss on this basis does not seem to reflect reality
as it relates to the assertion of the defense of lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
One further thought: this internal inconsistency in the deadline for
motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in addition to
being problematic, seems unnecessary. There does not seem to be any
reason why such a motion could not-or should not-be made prior to
pleading. There is also little reason to think that this is not already
happening. As discussed previously, the defendant, as well as the court
itself, not only have tremendous incentives to raise this defense, but to
do so sooner (usually at the earliest opportunity) rather than later. Even
the plaintiff has some incentives in this regard, for an early resolution of
this issue allows that party to avoid wasting time in the wrong court and
possibly avoiding a statute of limitations problem.
Admittedly, the current Rule 12(b) deadline for making such a
motion (generally twenty-one days) is short, perhaps too short.99 But this
deadline may be extended (or perhaps this portion of Rule 12 should be
amended; more on that, below).'o In any event, it would be naive to
think that even today, there is not some number of actions
lacking federal subject-matter jurisdiction that go undetected. It is
difficult to imagine that the imposition of a deadline similar to that used
for defects in personal jurisdiction and venue would result in a
significant increase.1 0
D.

Direct and CollateralReview

Finally, there is the somewhat aberrational treatment of subjectmatter jurisdiction on direct and collateral review, at least when
compared with other "jurisdictional" prerequisites such as personal
jurisdiction and venue. Once again, many of these discrepancies can be
traced to the (historically) nonwaivable and nonforfeitable nature of the
defense of lack of subj ect-matter jurisdiction, at least in federal courts.
Starting with direct review: If the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction was litigated in the district court, an adverse ruling generally
may be appealed by the losing party.' 02 In this sense, subject-matter
jurisdiction is treated no differently from personal jurisdiction
and venue.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1), (b).
100. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(4).
101. All of this also assumes that the failure to eliminate actions lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction would be something of a travesty. This notion will be addressed (debunked?) in the next
Part. See infra Part Ill.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d.
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The primary difference relates to how these issues are treated if not
litigated in the district court, or if litigated, are not appealed by the
losing party. In this context, defects in personal jurisdiction and venue
(among other procedural prerequisites) are considered waived or
forfeited, and thus cannot be considered further on appeal.10 But
because subject-matter jurisdiction, unlike most defenses, cannot be
waived or forfeited or be the product of consent, a purported lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised on appeal regardless of
whether litigated below, even by the appellate court itself.'" All of the
major treatises in this area seem to be in accord."'
The rationale for this divergent treatment of subject-matter
jurisdiction vis-d-vis other procedural defenses is essentially the same as
the rationale behind the absence of any meaningful deadline for the
assertion of the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the
district court, and is similarly weak. It is a distinction that does not
appear to be compelled under the Constitution or by federal statute. 0
Rather, it seems to be nothing more than a common law practice. It is,
though, a practice that produces yet another complication in this area of
civil procedure, and potentially imposes a tremendous cost. 0 7

103. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ("[N]either personal
jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject-matter jurisdiction is,
for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and
both may be waived by the parties.").
104. See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908).
105. As one leading treatise puts it:
Because a party may not waive the defense of subject matter jurisdiction, it is clear that
the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. Indeed, the independent
establishment of subject matter jurisdiction is so important that a party ostensibly
invoking federal jurisdiction may later challenge it as a means of avoiding an adverse
result on the merits.
13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3522, at 122-23 (footnote omitted); accord PETER HAY ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.17, at 381 (5th ed. 2010) ("Unlike issues of personal jurisdiction and notice,
which are waived if not contested at the case's outset, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
remains open on direct review of the case, even upon the court's own motion.").
106. For example, with respect to the ability to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction for the
first time on direct review, one treatise states: "This harsh rule would be indefensible if what was
involved was a simple question of procedural regulation of practice. It can be justified only because
the issue concerns the fundamental constitutional question of the allocation of judicial power
between the federal and state governments." 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3522, at 124-25
(footnote omitted). But is not the ability to raise this defense by a pre-answer motion protection
enough, when it is enough for defenses implicating equally important constitutional concepts, such
as personal jurisdiction? Why or how does the Constitution require a different result here?
107. As one scholar describes it:
If a case can be litigated for years in the trial court, briefed, argued and considered first
in an intermediate appellate court and subsequently in a supreme court, and after a
decision on the merits by the supreme court the party who initially filed the suit or the
supreme court itself can for the first time challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the
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A well-known example can be found in the venerable case of
Capron v. Van Noorden.10 s As the hornbook explains:
In Capron, plaintiff brought a tort action against defendant in the North
Carolina federal court. The plaintiff appealed from the jury's verdict
for the defendant, alleging, among other things, that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the pleadings, although
identifying the defendant as a citizen of North Carolina, were silent as
to the citizenship of the plaintiff. Since federal jurisdiction would exist
only if the plaintiff were of diverse citizenship from the defendant, and
since diversity had not been demonstrated, the Supreme Court reversed
the judgment. This case strikingly exemplifies the paramount
importance attached to the limitations on federal-court jurisdiction: the
plaintiff, who had chosen the federal forum, was permitted to
challenge, for the first time on appeal, the jurisdiction of the court of
his own selection. The Supreme Court, in effect, declared that allowing
unscrupulous or careless plaintiffs to escape adverse jury verdicts, thus
wasting precious judicial resources, was of less concern than the
possibility of extending federal jurisdiction beyond its constitutional
and statutory limits. 109

Though this summary represents an accurate description of the Capron
Court's decision, that decision-which was not at all required by the
limited nature of federal subject-matter jurisdiction-should strike even
a non-lawyer as quite obviously ridiculous.11 o
It might be observed once again that state courts generally do not
treat subject-matter jurisdiction as it is treated in the federal courts.
Rather, most state courts treat this matter as they treat personal
jurisdiction and venue-i.e., as waivable and forfeitable defenses."' The
reason they are able to do this (again) seems to relate to the common law
nature of this doctrine, coupled with differing notions as to how to
handle deficiencies of this nature.11 2 Again, the particular results here do

trial court and have the entire matter dismissed, the waste of private and public resources
is enormous.
Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdictionas a New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly
Horse, BYU L. REv. 1, 3 (1988).
108. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
109. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.2, at 13.
110. Cf Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In this case, the late,
great Justice used this memorable line (albeit in a quite different context).
111. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3522, at 100 ("Most state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction, and the presumption is that that they have subject matter jurisdiction over any
controversy unless a showing is made to the contrary."); see also Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
112. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.1, at
131 (4th ed. 2010) ("Whether a court's competence to adjudicate the subject matter is jurisdictional,
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not seem to have been pre-ordained; rather, it seems more a balancing of
competing policy interests, a balancing that for some reason results in a
more exalted treatment of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal courts.
As for collateral review, complicated might be the most charitable
way to describe the current treatment of subject-matter jurisdiction,"' at
least when compared with the rules relating to personal (or "territorial")
jurisdiction and notice. With respect to the latter concepts, Professors
Casad and Clermont state:
In summary, if the defendant appears and does not litigate the
threshold defense of territorial jurisdiction or adequate notice, the
defendant waives it. If the defendant litigates one of these threshold
defenses but the court finds authority, the ruling precludes the
defendant on both. Either way, the appearing defendant cannot attack
the resulting judgment on these grounds in subsequent litigation. Thus,
relief from judgment on the ground of territorial jurisdiction or
adequate notice can lie only from a judgment entered after the attacker
had completely defaulted. 114
On the other hand, with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction,

Casad and Clermont state:
Putting the cases and the Second Restatement together, then, we can
say that a holding of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction
precludes the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on that
ground in subsequent litigation, except in special circumstances such
as where the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or the
judgment substantially infringes on the authority of another court or
agency. Because unraised subject-matter jurisdiction is supposedly
always implicitly determined to exist in any action litigated to
judgment, such determination has the res judicata consequences of an
actually litigated determination of the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction insofar as foreclosing attack on the judgment, although the
court in subsequent litigation may be more likely to find applicable an
exception to res judicata. The bottom line is that relief from judgment

in the sense that a judgment rendered in violation of a state or nation's internal rules of judicial
competence is void and subject to collateral attack, or whether a court's exceeding its subject matter
competence is merely error that may be corrected only by direct appeal, depends upon the rules of
the state or nation in which the court sits.").
113. Actually, the law in this area sometimes seems closer to confused, if not contradictory.
Compare Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 .n.9 (2004) ("Even subject-matter jurisdiction,
however, may not be attacked collaterally."), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 69
(AM. LAW INST. 1982), and id. § 69 cmt. a, at 176 (describing the "very limited circumstances" for
such an attack).
114.

CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 92, at 267-68.
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on the ground of subject-matter jurisdiction is readily available only in
cases where all defendants defaulted. 115
Still, when looking at the law in this area as a whole-and without
getting into all of the detail that usually accompanies attempts to explain
these distinctions-perhaps two general observations may be made. The
first is that although the standards for collateral review of alleged defects
of personal jurisdiction and notice and that for subject-matter
jurisdiction do not yet seem quite the same, in that the latter still seems
to include some exceptions not found in the former, the law relating to
these matters is tantalizingly close to convergence. All seem to agree
that relief should be available in the default judgment context, but
probably (or mostly) unavailable otherwise."'
The second (related) observation is that the rationales for additional
opportunities for collateral review of subject-matter jurisdiction, like
those relating to direct review, seem somewhat weak. As another leading
treatise describes it:
The res judicata effects of a judgment entered by a court that lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction have not been captured in any rule or clear
statement of controlling policies. The approach to such judgments has
instead sought to reconcile two competing perceptions. Res judicata
effects have been resisted in order to serve the traditionally strong
desire to confine courts within the proper limits of appointed
competence. At the same time, it is recognized that the general values
of res judicata not only apply but may apply with particular force
when the only objection is that correct substantive rules have been
administered in a fair procedure in a court that simply lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction. The broad terms of this competition may be
particularized into more specific tests that seek to measure the
importance of maintaining specific jurisdictional lines. Recent

115. Id. at 270; accord FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 ("However, once a final
judgment has been rendered in a federal-court action, the concern for stability and repose underlying
the doctrine of preclusion, combined with the philosophy that courts of one system should give
effect to the judgments of the courts of another system, generally outweighs the principles of limited
federal jurisdiction. Thus, although direct attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction are permitted even
in the Supreme Court, as illustrated by the Capron case, in the absence of extraordinary
countervailing circumstances, collateral attacks on the judgment of a federal court in a later
proceeding alleging a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction are not permitted." (footnotes omitted)).
116. See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. d, at 120 ("Even if the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction has not been raised and determined, the judgment after becoming
final should ordinarily be treated as wholly valid if the controversy has been litigated in any other
respect."); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 92, at 271 (observing that "most successful attacks on
invalidity come against default judgments"); HAY, supra note 105, § 5.21, at 387 ("Even objections
to subject matter jurisdiction, which are not cured by a defendant's appearance, generally may not
be contested collaterally unless the judgment was taken by default.").
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decisions have worked these tests more and more toward
supporting res judicata. Today, it is safe to conclude that most
federal-court judgments are res judicata notwithstanding a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.117
These observations, coupled with the unlikelihood that an
erroneous determination with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction could
survive through the entry of a final judgment (and, if necessary, an
appeal) in the non-default context-such defects simply do not seem to
arise with any frequency in the modem world"'-there seems to be little
reason not to equate these standards.
III.

RECONCILING THE "EFFECTS" OF FEDERAL
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

As the discussion in Part II suggests, many of the procedural rules
relating to subject-matter jurisdiction make little sense, as does the law
relating to how this topic is treated on direct and collateral review.
History aside, there seems to be little reason to maintain the status quo.
Something should be done. It does little good-and in fact, it is
downright counterproductive-to have procedural rules that are
routinely observed in their breach and legal "principles" that are fraught
with exceptions.
The best course, it seems, would be to treat federal subject-matter
jurisdiction more like state subject-matter jurisdiction and more like
personal jurisdiction. There is no compelling reason why subject-matter
and personal jurisdiction, both prerequisites to the entry of a valid
judgment,"' should be treated differently, and between the two, the law

"

117. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIL § 4428, at 7 (2d ed.
2002); see also id. at 22-23 ("Unintentional mistakes of jurisdiction do not threaten any enduring
values, particularly in many of the more arcane quibbles of complete diversity, properly pleaded
federal questions, and supplemental jurisdiction.... Despite the emphasis in some opinions on the
fact that the jurisdictional question was actually litigated and resolved in the first action, failure to
raise the question should not permit the question to be opened later in ordinary circumstances ....
(footnotes omitted)). Putting these cases together, it seems clear that a federal court judgment is
binding notwithstanding a simple lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without regard to whether the
jurisdictional question was litigated or appealed.
118. See SPILLENGER, supra note 17, at 266 (observing that "[plroblems like these don't arise
very often").
119.

See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§

1, at 30 (AM. LAW INST. 1982)

("Requisites of a Valid Judgment").
A court has authority to render judgment in an action when the court has jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the [case] . .. , and
(1) The party against whom judgment is to be rendered has submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court, or
(2) Adequate notice has been afforded the party ... and the court has territorial

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

938

[Vol. 46:913

relating to personal jurisdiction seems the more workable and is more in
line with how other procedural prerequisites are treated. The benefits
from the resulting reconciliation would be substantial.
A.

The PleadingRequirement

Despite its familiarity to those who engage in federal civil practice,
it seems that there should be no requirement that subject-matter
jurisdiction be pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint. In this area, the
practice in most states (which generally have no such requirement)
seems superior. 12 0 Subject-matter jurisdiction certainly may be pleaded,
and that might even be a good idea in many actions, but there is little to
be gained from a firm rule in this regard. 12 1 Even without a
pleading requirement (which, again, provides little assurance that
subject-matter jurisdiction is proper in fact), plaintiffs have adequate
incentives for getting subject-matter jurisdiction right, and defendants
have adequate incentives for ensuring that they do. Rule 8 should be
amended accordingly.
B. Responding to the Complaint
Obviously, eliminating the jurisdictional pleading requirement
would dramatically lessen the need for defendants to respond to such
allegations in the answer, a practice that borders on useless. This would
also save the parties time and money. On the other hand, were the
defendant to respond to the plaintiff s jurisdictional allegations (whether
required to or not) any admissions should be binding on that party. This
should include any allegations that might be regarded as "legal," as
opposed to "factual," for ultimately there is no coherent distinction
between the two. 12 2

Serious thought also could be given to eliminating the obligation to
allege at least some of the defenses enumerated in Rule 12(b), including
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in the answer. Such defenses
typically can and should be asserted (and resolved) by motion pre-

jurisdiction ....
Id.
120.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

121. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b).
122. See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1769, 1770, 1790-800 (2003); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV.
1191, 1209 (2011).
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answer. 123 Simply alleging such defenses provides some measure of
notice, but little else.
C.

Motions to Dismiss andfor Relieffrom Judgment

With respect to motions to dismiss, subject-matter jurisdiction
should be treated like personal jurisdiction and venue. Specifically, Rule
12(b) should mean what it says: that a motion to dismiss on this basis
"must be made before pleading," under penalty of waiver. 124 The
propriety of such a defense, like lack of personal jurisdiction, should be
resolved at the pleading stage. The possibility of a dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction should not hang over the plaintiff through
judgment and even appeal. Such a practice generally would compel the
court to resolve the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction before getting to
the merits of the plaintiff's claims. There is no reason why this could not
be accomplished in the vast majority of actions. And no longer would
plaintiffs or courts have to deal with the specter of a tardy motion to
dismiss made months or even years down road. Nothing about this
defense seems to mandate this sort of practice, a practice that makes
scant sense and need not be tolerated. That an erroneous trial court
ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction may be appealed should be
assurance enough that a correct ruling ultimately will be made.
D.

Direct and CollateralReview

Finally, reconciling subject-matter jurisdiction with other
procedural defenses would bring to an end the anomalous treatment of
subject-matter jurisdiction on direct and collateral review, both between
these forms of review and in relation to the treatment of other procedural
defects. Again, defects in subject-matter jurisdiction should be deemed
waived unless asserted in a pre-answer motion to dismiss as suggested in
Rule 12(b). This change
is justified because both the other party and the judicial system have
been put to substantial expense in time and money to decide the case
on the merits. This expense may all have been avoided if the party
objecting to subject matter jurisdiction had done so as a preliminary
matter prior to trial.

125

123. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
124. Id.
125. Martineau, supra note 107, at 34.
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It also "will further enhance the finality of judgments."12 6 Finally, this
change would provide even more incentive for defendants to consider
the propriety of subject-matter jurisdiction and to raise any objections
thereto early in the proceedings.
These are not new ideas, and there does not appear to be any legal
impediment to implementing them. Indeed, more than fifty years
ago, Professor Dan Dobbs concluded: "There is no reason why
ordinary procedural rules cannot apply to issues of jurisdiction so that
objections not timely raised are deemed waived."l2 7 Similarly, a leading
treatise states:
Arguably, Congress may ameliorate, if not abolish altogether, the
doctrine that a jurisdictional defect may be noticed at any time and the
action dismissed. Clearly this is so if the defect is that the case is not
within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, for example, when the
amount-in-controversy requirement in diversity cases is not satisfied.
After all, Congress, having created that limitation, may determine at
what stage of the case it can be asserted. The matter is more difficult if
the defect is that the case does not fall within the constitutional grant of
judicial power. Even in this context, however, a tenable argument may
be made that the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution
gives Congress the power to avoid wasteful burdens on the courts by
setting a time limit for raising jurisdictional questions. 128

126. Id at 35.
127. See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject Matter
JurisdictionBefore FinalJudgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491, 491 (1967); see also Dobbs, supra note
6, at 51, 78 ("We have come to think of the no consent rule as the inevitable product of either logic
or the rational demands of policy. It is not. The rule has not always existed, even in
England .... [A]hnost every reason that history suggests to support the rule against jurisdiction by
consent has disappeared."). A similar proposal was floated at about that same time by a very august
group of procedural scholars on behalf of the American Law Institute. See generally AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

(Tentative Draft Nos. 4-6 1966-1968) (proposing a unified treatment of federal question
jurisdiction).
128. 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, 3522, at 137; cf 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117,
§ 4430, at 40.
In contrast to the rules surrounding lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the rules that
relate res judicata to an asserted lack of personal jurisdiction are simple and well settled.
If a defendant appears to challenge personal jurisdiction, disposition of the challenge in
directly binding as a matter of res judicata. A defendant who appears to litigate the
merits without properly preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction forfeits the right
to raise the objection in the initial proceeding and is bound by the resulting judgment.
Objections to personal jurisdiction remain open to the defendant who remains entirely
aloof from the original proceeding, but if it is later concluded that personal jurisdiction
existed the merits of the action are foreclosed unless relief can be had from the
default judgment.
Id.
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Thus, though trial court rulings on jurisdictional matters certainly
may be raised on appeal following the entry of a final judgment, most
procedural defects are not subject to direct attack if not timely raised
below. 12 9 Subject-matter jurisdiction should be added to that list. This
would seemingly also prevent unasserted objections to subject-matter
jurisdiction from being raised collaterally. The only general exception to
this approach (again) should be the treatment of this defense in the
default judgment context. There has long been a tradition of allowing
defendants to raise issues involving subject-matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and notice collaterally if the first judgment was the product
of a default.130 In the default judgment situation, the defendant might not
have been given a reasonable opportunity to litigate these issues, which
are regarded in this context to be fundamental.13 ' This presumption
(which also has the virtue of placing subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction on equal footing) should be preserved.
E.

Two FurtherThoughts

Before concluding, two additional matters might warrant some
consideration. The first relates to the court's role vis-it-vis the assertion
of defenses other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The second
§ 4427, at 22-23.

129.

18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 117,

130.

See, e.g., 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS

§ 65

(AM. LAW INST.

1982)

("Invalid Default Judgment: Lack of Subject Matter or Territorial Jurisdiction or Adequate Notice,"
"Except as stated in § 66, a judgment by default may be avoided if it was rendered without
compliance with the requirements stated in § 1."). A contrary view is expressed in 13D CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 3536, at 9-11

(3d ed. 2008).

Suppose, however, that the first case ended in a default judgment, and that there was no
litigation of any issue. In such a case, as seen above, the defendant could mount a
collateral attack on the judgment by asserting that the court lacked personal jurisdiction.
There appears to be little support, however, for allowing a collateral attack with regard to
subject matter jurisdiction. This is as it should be. It is important to remember the
profound difference between personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. The
latter concerns the allocation of power between different sovereigns. A court is under a
continuing obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction-even in
cases involving default judgment. Thus, it seems appropriate to assume that the court
entering the default judgment did make a determination that it had subject matter
jurisdiction. After all, the court had no business entering a judgment unless it had already
determined that the case was properly before it.
Id. (footnote omitted). But with all due respect, there seem to be some flaws in this argument, an
argument that runs contrary to other authorities in this area. Default judgments are often entered not
by the court itself, but by the court's clerk. Even in those situations where the default judgment is
entered by the judge, it is not at all clear (at least based on the experience of the author of this
Article) that it would be appropriate to assume that the court made a proper determination as to
subject-matter jurisdiction. The court might well lack the information it needs to make this
determination, even assuming it attempted to do so.
131.

See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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relates to the possible need for some judicial discretion were the reforms
proposed in this Article to be implemented. Essentially, both of these
matters relate to the seemingly eternal battle between efficiency and
achieving the "correct" or "best" result in every case.
1. Enhanced Judicial Supervision as to Other Procedural Defects
As discussed previously, there is a long tradition of sua sponte
supervision of subject-matter jurisdiction by the federal courts
themselves.13 2 Though this Article argues that subject-matter jurisdiction
should be treated essentially the same as other "jurisdictional" matters,
such as personal jurisdiction and venue, at least insofar as waiver,
forfeiture, and consent are concerned,133 it seems that there is still some
role for the courts to play.
Though a defendant generally might be permitted to waive or
forfeit some procedural defense, or even consent to some result not
otherwise permitted, this does not necessarily mean that the courts must
abide by that result. The primary reason is that such conduct by the
parties potentially implicates values or interests beyond the parties
themselves. 13 4 When such values or interests become significant, it
seems that the court, the only other "interested person" involved in the
action, has something of a duty to enforce important procedural
requirements. Courts, acting sua sponte, can "represent" the interests of
the judiciary (perhaps even the Constitution) to ensure that actions
lacking essential "jurisdictional" elements are dismissed prior to trial.
It seems, therefore, that a court not only may dismiss an action for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte, it almost certainly should.
But it also seems that the same should be true, at least to some extent, of
other certain other "jurisdictional" defenses. Take venue, for example.
The consensus view seems to be that the primary purpose of venue is to
protect the defendant from having to litigate in a district with little or no
connection to that party or to the activities giving rise to the plaintiff's
claim.135 As a result, the federal courts seem to have taken somewhat of
a hands-off approach to efforts by the parties to consent to litigate in
districts where venue might otherwise be improper. 13 6 But venue statutes
132. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part J. C.
134. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 12

cmt. d, at 121-22 ("The interests

primarily at stake in resolving [at least some questions of subject-matter jurisdiction] are
governmental and societal, not those of the parties."); Shannon, supra note 46, at 32 (concluding

that in deciding whether to act sua sponte, a court "is attempting to balance competing policy
interests").
135.

See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1,

136.

See 28 U.S.C.

§

§ 2.15,

at 83, 83-84 n.5.

1404(a) (2012) (providing that venue may be transferred "to any
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have other purposes as well. For example, it is surely better for juries
(and perhaps even judges) to hear cases involving local events. 137 And if
a substantial number of litigants were to suddenly start choosing forums
based on factors not provided for by statutes-for example, if everyone
started including contractual forum-selection clauses specifying the
District of Hawaii because it is, well, Hawaii-should such clauses
unthinkingly be upheld, even if they result in serious resource allocation
issues?' 38 It seems that the answer is (or should be) "not necessarily." 13 9
Sua sponte supervision seemingly has a role to play here as well.1 40
Admittedly, there should probably be a sliding scale here; arguably,
judicial supervision (and intervention) should be at its peak with respect
to subject-matter jurisdiction, and play a much lesser role with respect to
things like personal jurisdiction and venue. But that is a far cry from the
seemingly all-or-nothing approach taken by courts in these areas today.
2. A Continuing Role for Limited Judicial Discretion
As also discussed previously, current subject-matter jurisdiction
practice is to some extent marred by the potentiality of a number of ad
hoc exceptions to more general rules.' 4 ' Amending some of the rules
relating to subject-matter jurisdiction and changing some of the baseline
presumptions about how it should operate on direct and collateral review
should help minimize the need for such exceptions. 142 But will these
changes eliminate the need for exceptions entirely? The answer is
unclear. Though the hope is that they will, subject-matter jurisdiction has
district ... to which all parties have consented"); 01berding v. 11l. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340
(1953) (recognizing that parties may consent or waive objections to venue).
137.

FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 1,

§ 2.16,

at 87.

138. This question is not merely hypothetical. Similar issues have arisen in the Eastern District
of Texas with respect to patent cases, at least prior to the Supreme Court's decision in TC Hartland
v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, 581 U.S. 1514 (2017). See Jonas Anderson, Judge Shopping in the
Eastern Districtof Texas, 48 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. REv. 539, 539, 544-50 (2016) ("Judge Rodney
Gilstrap has a lot of patent cases on his docket. In fact, in 2015 there were 1686 patent cases that
were filed and assigned to Judge Gilstrap, an astronomical number for a single judge.").
139. Cf Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
the enforcement of some contractual forum-selection clauses "could interfere with the orderly
allocation ofjudicial business and injure other third-party interests (that is, interests of persons other
than the parties to the contract containing the clause)").
140. See, e.g.,. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

CIvIL

§ 3826,

at 551 (2007) ("[S]ome courts occasionally say that the objection [to venue] may be

raised sua sponte under extraordinary circumstances.").

141. SeesupraPartIl.
142. To a large extent, the battle here, as Casad and Clermont point out, is between validity and
finality. "Validity here represents the yearning to get things right, to pursue truth to the end. Finality
represents the concession to the brevity of life, to the reality that justice demands an end to
litigation." CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 92, at 272. This Article (like the law generally)
"ultimately favors finality." Id.
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always been a complicated subject. Exceptions probably cannot be
foreclosed entirely. It is conceivable, therefore, that even under a regime
in which objections to subject-matter jurisdiction are waived if not
timely asserted, there might be a need for exceptions under extraordinary
circumstances.1 4 3 But such exceptions seemingly should be quite rare.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Current subject-matter jurisdiction practice, though wellentrenched, seems upon closer examination to be somewhat
indefensible. Changes should be made. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 should be amended to eliminate the pleading of subject-matter
jurisdiction. This should help obviate the need to respond to allegations
of this nature. Moreover, Rules 12 and 60 should be amended to prevent
the assertion of this defense beyond the pleading stage (except in the
default judgment context). Such a move would significantly (and
appropriately) limit the ability to raise this defense on direct or collateral
review. It would, in short, help "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."'" Perhaps more importantly, the practice
relating to federal subject-matter jurisdiction would be reconciled with
that relating to other "jurisdictional" concepts such as personal
jurisdiction and venue, as well as state subject-matter jurisdiction
practice, which has avoided many of these problems without incident.
143. One example might be the approach taken in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
which provides:
When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the
parties from litigating the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction in
subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its
entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another
tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an adequately
informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of
procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity
belatedly to attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 12

(AM. LAW. INST. 1982). Regarding this section,

Casad and Clermont state:
It is to be noted that preclusion of the issue under this section does not necessarily
require in all cases that the question be actively litigated, and it may be enough that the
court implicitly determined its own jurisdiction. At the same time, by virtue of the
section's exceptions, there may be no preclusion in some cases where the issue was
actually litigated and determined. Generalization is difficult, and so the Second
Restatement's black-letter rule does little more than identify certain factors to be
considered in weighing the competing policies in each case.
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 92, at 270.

144.

FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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Alas, sound reasoning might not be enough to get the Rules
Committee to proceed on some of these matters. Tradition is a powerful
thing. Moreover, the fact that the amendments proposed here would, in
actuality, have little effect on post-pleading practice, though seemingly a
virtue, might actually be a deterrent. Hopefully it will be enough that
these amendments would promote simplicity, uniformity, predictability,
and avoid unnecessary waste. Exceptions might be unavoidable
regardless of which way one goes on these issues, and cases probably
will continue to be decided suboptimally. The questions for now relate to
baseline presumptions and how best to minimize errors and increase the
efficiency of the federal courts.
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